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ABSTRACT
Following a series of experiments in which six orangutans and one gorilla discrim-
inated photographs of diVerent animal species in a two-choice touch screen pro-
cedure, Vonk & MacDonald (2002) and Vonk & MacDonald (2004) concluded that
orangutans, but not the gorilla, seemed to learn intermediate level category dis-
criminations, such as primates versus non-primates, more rapidly than they learned
concrete level discriminations, such as orangutans versus humans. In the current
experiments, four of the same orangutans and the gorilla were presented with de-
layed matching-to-sample tasks in which they were rewarded for matching photos
of diVerent members of the same primate species; golden lion tamarins, Japanese
macaques, and proboscis monkeys, or family; gibbons, lemurs (Experiment 1), and
subsequently for matching photos of diVerent species within the following classes:
birds, reptiles, insects, mammals, and ﬁsh (Experiment 2). Members of both Great
Apespecieswererapidlyabletomatchthephotosatlevelsabovechance.Orangutans
matchedimagesfrombothcategorylevelsspontaneouslywhereasthegorillashowed
eVects of learning to match intermediate level categories. The results show that bi-
ological knowledge is not necessary to form natural categories at both concrete and
intermediatelevels.
Subjects Animal Behavior, Developmental Biology, Evolutionary Studies
Keywords Gorilla, Matching, Orangutans, Biological categories, Concepts
INTRODUCTION
Rosch et al. (1976) suggested a chronological and hierarchical structure for concepts, such
that humans ﬁrst learn basic level concepts (e.g., dog) and only later are able to learn
subordinate (e.g., poodle) and superordinate (e.g., mammal or animal) concepts (see
also Mervis & Rosch, 1981). This chronology of concept learning seems tied to language
in that the basic level category words are the ﬁrst learned and the most commonly
used. It has been suggested that the formation of superordinate categories relies less
upon perceptual feature analysis and more on an understanding of how the category
coheres, across signiﬁcant perceptual variance (Spalding & Ross, 2000). Superordinate
categories are thus thought of as being more conceptually based or “abstract” relative
to basic level categories, and it has been speculated that language is necessary for the
formation of these later categories (Benelli, 1988; Keil, 1988; Nelson, 1988; Premack, 1983).
Organisms may be inherently preprogrammed to distinguish between items at the level of
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(2000) has articulated an opposing view, supported by several studies, in which the
conceptualization of superordinate categories by human infants may actually precede
that of basic level categories. Mandler’s description highlights the distinction between
perceptual and conceptual categorization, a distinction not traditionally acknowledged
by other researchers. In her view, exemplars within basic level categories may be
associated together on a perceptual basis before exemplars from superordinate categories
are associated perceptually. In contrast, when forming conceptual categories, which are
based on shared, underlying properties as opposed to perceptual similarity, more global,
abstract categories such as animals, foods, etc., may emerge ﬁrst. This may be the case
because children learn about broad categories, such as animate/inanimate distinctions
priortolearningspeciﬁcdistinctionssuchasbetweenreptilesandmammals.
Recent work (Coley, 2007) has indicated that children may make global distinctions
such as between animals and non-animals, but are less likely, compared to adults, to
consider humans to be similar to other primates or non-primate animals. This recent
work, highlighting diVerences between children and adults with regard to between
categorical judgments of similarity, reinforces the notion that such categorization is not
made on a purely perceptual basis. In addition, Gelman & Davidson (2013) have shown
that both children and adults use category membership more than similarity to make
basic level category inferences, although their studies involved experimenter-created
rather than actual natural categories. Thus there is some disagreement as to what sorts
ofcategorizationdependuponphysicalsimilarity,dependuponlanguageandemergeﬁrst
in the human infant. By studying concept formation in non-human primates one can
determineparallelsintheemergenceofnon-languagebasedcategorization.Inthecurrent
study, two species of great ape (orangutans and a gorilla) were required to match images
basedonbiologicalclassiﬁcationsatthelevelofspecies,familyorclass.
Although taxonomic class groupings may be considered basic level concepts (Roberts &
Mazmanian,1988),ithasbeensuggestedthattheabilitytomaketaxonomicclassiﬁcations
of natural stimuli depends upon biological or scientiﬁc knowledge (Eimas & Quinn, 1994;
Hampton, 1998; Inagaki, 1989), as well as language (Anggoro, Medin & Waxman, 2010;
Benelli, 1988; Gelman, 1989; Nelson, 1988). Quinn & Tanaka (2007) found that expertise
within the same basic level category aided infants in the ability to discriminate other
concrete level categories, emphasizing the role of expertise in category discrimination.
Coley (2007) showed that children of eight years or older were more likely to categorize
humansasbeingsimilartoprimatesandprimatesasbeingmoresimilartomammalsthan
non-mammals, but younger children were not sensitive to these taxonomic groupings,
further supporting the notion that intermediate level biological categories are learned
rather than perceived. At least in humans, it appears that discriminations are not made
solely on the basis of similarity of perceptual features. Categorizing stimuli according to
biologicaltaxonomiesmaythenbepresumedtobeauniquelyhumantendency.
Against this supposition, exciting recent work from neuroscience has demonstrated a
common code for inferior temporal (IT) object representations in monkeys and humans
Vonk (2013), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.158 2/25(Kiani et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte, 2008). This work has demonstrated global representations
along a continuum of inanimate to animate objects, but also within category distinctions
between diVerent taxonomic groups. Connolly et al. (2012) have suggested a continuum
of activation representing categorical structure from insects to primates that mirrors
the continuum from inanimate to animate objects. Connolly and colleagues suggest a
categorical structure within the domain of animate objects that reﬂects the biological
relations among species, suggesting that such categorization may be innate within
primates. Furthermore, Murai and colleagues (Murai et al., 2004; Murai et al., 2005),
using a familiarization-novelty preference task, have suggested that infant monkeys,
chimpanzees and humans may spontaneously form categories at least at the global level,
usingcategoriesofmammals,furnitureandvehicles.Thecurrentexperimentsinvestigated
the ability to make explicit classiﬁcations of more ﬁnite natural class distinctions in two
otherspeciesofGreatApe;orangutansandgorillas.Inthecaseofnon-humans,categories
would be based on shared observable features rather than on underlying knowledge of
taxonomic class structures, particularly given that the only information provided involves
visual features in two dimensional photographs. However, it was of interest to determine
whether exemplars of more closely related groupings are more readily categorized
together compared to more distantly related members of the same class. We predicted
that orangutans may readily categorize stimuli from both concrete and intermediate level
categories,whereasthegorillamightcategorizestimulimorereadilyattheconcretelevel.
Subordinate categories, for example, ‘poodles’, are described as being concrete (or least
abstract) along a hierarchy of abstraction because exemplars within such categories share
manyreadilyperceivedfeaturesandcanbeeasilydistinguishedfromexemplarsfromother
categories on a purely perceptual basis. Basic level categories, such as ‘dogs’, are described
as being intermediate in terms of abstractness. The variability within an intermediate
category is greater than the variability within a concrete level category. For instance,
the more general category of dogs includes not only poodles but hounds, terriers, and
many other types of dogs, which may vary in terms of size, color and distinctive features
such as the long, short body of the dachshund. However, category distinctiveness is also
increased such that members within an intermediate level category share fewer features
with members of other intermediate level categories, whereas concrete exemplars may
share many features with exemplars from other concrete level categories subsumed within
the same intermediate category. For example, toy poodles may look a lot like the bichon
frise but dogs may not look much like other mammals such as whales or marsupials. At
themostabstractlevel,suchas‘animal’,superordinatecategoryexemplarsshareevenfewer
perceptual features within a category but also share even fewer features with members
of other abstract categories. The category ‘mammal’ may be considered superordinate
to the basic level ‘dog’, but, in keeping with previously published studies (Roberts &
Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk & MacDonald, 2004; Vonk, Jett &
Mosteller,2012;Vonketal.,2013),‘mammals’willbeconsideredintermediatewith‘animal’
beingconsideredthemostabstractlevelcategory.
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herpetologist, insects may be easily categorized at much ﬁner levels than would be the
case for a third grade science student, or a novice adult, for that matter. Thus, while the
most generic level of categorization, e.g., insects may be a basic or intermediate level of
category for the novice, a more highly speciﬁed category such as hymenoptera may serve
as a basic level category for the herpetologist, with categories of wasps, bees, and ants–or
even particular species of each, serving as subordinate or concrete levels. For the purpose
of describing the current study, it is assumed that apes have no special expertise regarding
unfamiliarmembersoftheprimateorder,orbroaderclassofmammals,birds,ﬁsh,insects,
sotheintermediatelevelwillbeusedtorefertoclasswhiletheconcretelevelwillbeusedto
refertospeciesdiscriminations.
Often abstract level categories can be discriminated only with some additional
conceptual knowledge, rather than by relying on perceived shared attributes. For instance
one would not know that insects, birds, amphibians, and mammals all belonged to the
category‘animal’ifonewasunawareoftheirunobservablepropertiessuchastheabilityto
eat,breathe,reproduce,etc.Theeasewithwhichcategorymembershipcanbedetermined
on strictly a perceptual basis thus declines as one moves from concrete to abstract level
categories. The terms concrete and subordinate, intermediate and basic, and abstract and
superordinate have been used interchangeably. The former terms will be used exclusively
throughout the remainder of this manuscript in keeping with previous research (Vonk &
MacDonald,2002;Vonk&MacDonald,2004;Vonk,Jett&Mosteller,2012;Vonketal.,2013).
There is much evidence for concrete level discrimination learning in primates, (Fujita,
1987; Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1986; Fujita et al., 1997; Marsh & MacDonald, 2008; Yoshikubo,
1985)aswellasinpigeons(Herrnstein,1979;Herrnstein,Loveland&Cable,1976),butthere
is much less evidence for intermediate or abstract level natural concept discrimination
learning (although see Brooks et al. (2013) for evidence in rats). The diYculty with Brooks
et al. (2013) is that all of the discriminations were also between animate and inanimate
categories (e.g., chairs versus ﬂowers and cars versus humans)–allowing the rats to make
more global level discriminations. Recently, investigators (Autier-D´ erian et al., 2013)
have shown that domestic dogs are capable of categorizing many diverse dog species
together into a single basic level “dog” category. The dogs were also able to discriminate
between the species, demonstrating concrete level categorization. Caution is appropriate
when making cross species comparisons as the reader must take into account possible
diVerences in perceptual systems in diVerent organisms. However, the species tested in
relevantparadigmssharesophisticatedvisualacuityandcolorvisionmakingthemsuitable
candidates for categorical discrimination research. In a more relevant study, Tanaka
(2001) demonstrated that chimpanzees were able to discriminate exemplars both within
intermediate level categories (at the concrete level) and between intermediate categories.
The chimpanzees were trained to match exemplars that belonged to the same concrete
level category and subsequently matched those exemplars to other members of the same
intermediate, but diVerent concrete level category, when a concrete level match was no
longer an option. Because Tanaka’s chimpanzees were trained to make concrete level
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comparethechimpanzees’performanceonthetwolevelsofdiscrimination.
In one of only ﬁve published attempts to compare concept learning at diVerent levels of
abstractioninnon-humans,Roberts&Mazmanian(1988)studiedconceptdiscrimination
by pigeon, squirrel monkey and human subjects across three levels of abstraction, where
abstraction was deﬁned as the breadth of the category to be learned. At the concrete
level, the subjects were asked to discriminate between photographs of one bird species
(kingﬁshers) and other birds. At the intermediate level they were asked to discriminate
between birds and other animals. Finally, at the most abstract level they were asked to
discriminate between animals and non-animals. The authors found that humans easily
discriminatedconceptsatalllevelsofabstraction,whereasbothmonkeysandpigeonshad
diYcultywiththeintermediateleveldiscrimination.Thisﬁndingwassomewhatsurprising
because this intermediate level corresponds to the basic level that Rosch presumed was
easiest for humans to learn (Keil, 1988; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch et al., 1976). Ross et
al. (2003) suggest that children acquire such concepts by the age of six years. However, the
results may conﬁrm Mandler’s predictions (2000), particularly if the apes are performing
conceptualratherthanperceptualcategorizations.
Vonk & MacDonald (2002) and Vonk & MacDonald (2004) trained orangutans and a
gorillatodiscriminatebetweenphotographsofmembersoftheirownspeciesandhumans,
and between members of their own species and other primates (concrete level), between
primates and other species (intermediate level) and between animals and non-animals
(abstract level). The orangutans quickly learned the concrete and intermediate level
discriminations and also learned the most abstract discrimination, but with slightly more
diYculty. The gorilla subject appeared to have the most diYculty with the intermediate
level discrimination, although she also learned all discriminations and showed signiﬁcant
positive transfer to novel stimuli. Thus both species of Great Ape demonstrated the ability
to learn concepts at each level of abstraction, but the orangutans appeared to learn the
basicorintermediateleveldiscriminationthemostreadilywhilethegorillalearneditwith
the most diYculty. More recent follow-ups have shown chimpanzees to have the most
diYculty with the most abstract discriminations (Vonk et al., 2013) in that they required
more sessions to reach criterion as discriminations became more abstract, and were less
likely to show signiﬁcant transfer. In contrast, black bears showed signiﬁcant transfer at
alllevelsofconceptdiscrimination,evenwhentrainedonthemostabstractproblemsﬁrst
(Vonk,Jett&Mosteller,2012).
Some of the orangutans in the previous study (Vonk & MacDonald, 2004) learned to
select photos of primates very rapidly (e.g., within three 10-trial sessions), despite the
fact that the primates presented to them were of unfamiliar species. It was possible that
they simply selected photos that they preferred. A spontaneous preference indicates
that subjects may not have learned to abstract particular concepts or categories as
being “correct” within the context of the experiment but implicitly preferred photos
that happened to belong in the same taxonomic group. However, the very existence of
a preference suggested that they did perceive primates as distinct from other species
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category. Another possibility was that they selected photos of primates because these
photosweremoresimilartophotosthathadpreviouslybeenpresented,althoughselecting
these photos had not been reinforced. The latter explanation is unlikely, because of latent
inhibition, the ﬁnding that it becomes more diYcult to learn to respond to previously
unreinforced stimuli due to retroactive interference. The fact that this was not the case
for the orangutans suggests that they were attending to the category of the photo and
not the speciﬁc exemplar itself. In addition, diVerent and diverse primate species were
presented in each subsequent transfer photo set, and transfer performance remained
high. However, the question remained as to whether or not these apes would be equally
likely to learn other intermediate level discriminations, including those more analogous
to the bird/other animal discrimination tested by Roberts & Mazmanian (1988). Both
chimpanzees and black bears were tested on an intermediate problem in which the two
categories were equally inclusive and novel (carnivores for chimpanzees, or primates for
bears, versus ungulates). The black bears performed better than the chimpanzees in terms
of acquisition and transfer, suggesting the possibility of diVerent mechanisms for forming
thediscriminations.Here,itwasofinteresttodirectlycontrasttheacquisitionofmatching
intermediate level concepts to their acquisition of matching concrete level concepts in an
identicalprocedurefortheorangutansandgorillatestedpreviously.
The subjects were presented with a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task in order
to examine their understanding of several categories simultaneously. In contrast to the
previous studies, where the subjects learned to discriminate a single category at a time,
use of a DMTS procedure made it possible to have them categorize stimuli from several
diVerent species or classes within a single session. Each trial involved presentation of a
sample that was replaced by two comparison photos once the subject attended to the
sample.ThereinforcedcomparisonwasadiVerentphotoofthesameordiVerentmember
ofthesamespeciesorfamilyasthesample(Experiment1),oraphotoofadiVerentspecies
from the same class as the sample (Experiment 2). The non-reinforced comparison was
a photo of a member of a diVerent primate species (Experiment 1), or a member of a
diVerent class (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 tested for concrete level discriminations in
that the categorizations could be made by matching perceptual features of the stimuli. In
Experiment 2 an eVort was made to select photographs of species belonging to the same
taxonomic class that were nonetheless perceptually quite distinct from one another. For
instance, a photo of a stingray shared few features with a photo of the head of a blenny
ﬁsh, but both belonged to the ﬁsh category. Backgrounds varied both within and between
categories. Because the comparison stimuli did not share many perceptual features with
the sample stimulus, the subjects’ ability to correctly match the photos might indicate the
capacityforformingconceptsattheintermediatelevelofabstraction.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with photos of ﬁve diVerent primate species
(Japanese macaques, golden lion tamarins, proboscis monkeys) or families (gibbons,
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concrete level discrimination in which the exemplars within a category shared several
physical features, such as color, and body shape. However, in two of the categories,
(lemurs and gibbons) members of the same genus but diVerent closely related species
were included, and it was predicted that the subjects might have more diYculty when the
matchwasacloserelativecomparedtowhenthematchwasofthesamespecies.
Materials and methods
Subjects
One female western lowland gorilla, Zuri (age 4), three male Sumatran orangutans,
Dinding (44 years), Dinar (13 years), Molek (22 years) and one female Sumatran
orangutan, Abby (42 years), participated in these experiments. All subjects were housed
attheTorontoZoo,Toronto,Ontario,Canada.Theorangutansubjectsweregroup-housed
in an indoor exhibit and Zuri was housed separately at the time of testing, although she
had auditory and visual access to the other gorillas at the zoo. The gorillas had access to
bothindoorandoutdoorexhibits.OccasionallyZuriwasintegratedwiththeothergorillas
for brief periods. Orangutans could view gibbons from their exhibit, as well as various
bird, reptile, ﬁsh, and insect species. Dinding and Molek had been housed at the Yerkes
primate research center many years prior and could see chimpanzees and bonobos from
their enclosures there. Zuri could not view other primates from her enclosure but also
had exposure to birds, reptiles, and insects. Four of the subjects had participated in one
prior touch screen experiment (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk & MacDonald, 2004),
whereas Abby had participated in two prior touch-screen experiments (Vonk, 2003; Vonk
&MacDonald,2004).OnlyAbbyhadpreviouslyparticipatedinaDMTSprocedure(Vonk,
2003). Testing was approved by the Animal Care Review Board of York University, Canada
underthedirectionofSuzanneMacDonald.
Materials
The photo set included 20 color photographs of 5 diVerent primate species. There were 4
gibbon photos; two white-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar), one Mueller’s or Gray gibbon
(Hylobates muelleri) and one dark-handed gibbon (Hylobates agilis). There were four
lemur photos; three ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), and one collared brown lemur
(Eulemur fulvus collaris). Examples of these images appear in Fig. 1. There were also
four photos each of Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata fuscata), golden lion tamarins
(Leontopithecus rosalia), and proboscis monkeys (Nasalis larvatus). Each species was
depicted in various positions and orientations and in both close-up and far away shots.
Some photos showed only the face of the subject whereas other photos showed the full
body. Most photos depicted an individual whereas some included several individuals
of the same species. The backgrounds of the photos varied both within and between
categories. By varying such dimensions the extent to which irrelevant features might
control responding in the task was minimized. A list and brief description of the photos
usedappearsinAppendixS1.Allphotoswerenovelforallsubjects.
Vonk (2013), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.158 7/25Figure1 ExampleimagesusedinExp.1. Example images from two categories in Exp. 2: gibbons (A–D) and lemurs (E–H).
Procedure
The experiment was programmed in Filemaker Pro 3 software for Macintosh. The photos
were presented on a 1300 Apple touch screen monitor and were approximately 300 by 400 on
the screen, separated by approximately 1.500 and horizontally aligned. The monitor was
placed against the bars of the subjects’ housing and they were required to either reach
throughthemeshholestotouchthescreen(orangutans)ortoreachunderneathandtouch
the monitor (gorilla). In these experiments the experimenter sat behind the laptop, which
wascoveredbyaprotectivecovering,connectedtothetouchscreenwhichwaspushedright
up against the subjects’ enclosure. The images on the touchscreen were mirror-reversed
from the images on the laptop and the experimenter always gazed directly at the midpoint
of the screen. The experimenter could not see the subject’s face or ﬁngers, or the front
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incorrectnessofthechoiceuntilafterthechoicewasmade.
Subjectsweretestedindividuallyatthesametimeeachday.Theorangutansreceivedone
to four sessions per day, two or three times a week, whereas the gorilla was given between
ﬁveand tensessions adayfour daysa week.The numberofsessions wasdependent onthe
availability of the subjects and their keepers. Each session consisted of ten trials. During a
trial,asamplephotographwaspresentedinthecenterofthemonitorandstayedonscreen
untilthesubjectattendedtothephotoandtouchedit,activatingthetouchscreen.Thetwo
comparisonphotossubsequentlyappearedonthescreenafterashortdelay(approximately
3 s). The subject was then required to select, by touching, only one of the two comparison
photos.Ifheorsheselectedthephotothatmatchedthespeciesofthesampleheorshewas
givenasmallhighlypreferredfoodrewardbyhand(M&Msordriedfruitsandnutsforthe
orangutans, and dried fruits or nuts for the gorilla) during presentation of a blank screen.
If the subject made an incorrect response the screen advanced immediately to the blank
screen and then to the next sample photo with no reward and no time-out. Thus intertrial
intervalsvariedbutwerealwayslessthanoneminute.Sessionscontinueduntilalltentrials
were completed. Intersession intervals also varied but were always at least two minutes in
length.
Duringeachsession,halfofthephotoswerepresentedonceandhalfofthephotoswere
presented twice. If a photo had appeared as a correct comparison, it appeared as either
a sample or as an incorrect comparison the next time it appeared within that session.
This method discouraged a strategy of attending to individual exemplars and encouraged
attendingtotherelationshipbetweenthesampleandthecomparisonstimuli.Theorderof
presentation and pairing of the photographs was randomized for each session. Thus each
photoappearedasasample,asacorrectcomparisonorasanincorrectcomparisonduring
the course of the experiment. Each photo also appeared in both left and right positions
on the screen across sessions. Within a session, half of the correct comparisons appeared
on the left side of the screen, and half appeared on the right. Photos that appeared twice
duringsomesessionsappearedonlyonceduringothersessions.
Each species in the photos was represented in the sample twice and thus as a correct
and incorrect match twice as well within each session. Thus gibbons, proboscis monkeys,
tamarins,lemursandJapanesemacaqueseachappearedassamplesontwoofthetentrials
within a session in random order. The photo used as a correct match was always diVerent
from the sample photo so that there were no identity matching trials. The same photos
wereusedoneachsession.
For the ﬁrst two sessions of the task, the subjects (except for Abby, due to previous
training on a DMTS task) were given a small reward for simply touching the sample
photo, as well as for making the correct choice. This was done so that the animals would
learn to attend to, and select, the sample photo. After the second session, touching the
sample photo was no longer reinforced. The experiment was considered complete when
the subject was performing consistently, after a minimum of four blocks of ﬁve sessions
(20 sessions or 200 trials). Subjects received four to six blocks of ﬁve sessions, depending
Vonk (2013), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.158 9/25Figure 2 Results from Exp. 1. Average percent correct across blocks of 5 sessions (50 trials) for each
subject in Experiment 1.
on their level of performance. Abby completed the two experiments simultaneously as
a control for the order of testing. She ﬁrst completed ﬁve sessions of Experiment 2 and
then ﬁve sessions of Experiment 1. From that point on, she completed one or two sessions
of each experiment on each test day. The order of presentation of the two tasks was not
counterbalanced for the other subjects because it was felt that presentation of the more
visibly similar samples and exemplars in the concrete discrimination task would facilitate
acquisitionoftheDMTStaskthattheyhadnopriorexperiencewith.Recallthatthesefour
subjects had not received any prior training on MTS procedures and none of the ﬁve had
everreceivedidentity-matchingtrials.
Results and discussion
As shown in Fig. 2 and conﬁrmed by binomial tests, each subject performed at a level
signiﬁcantly greater than chance (50% correct) overall, all p’s < :001. Separate binomial
tests for each subject also indicated how many sessions were required to reach levels of
responding that were signiﬁcantly above chance. Molek’s performance was signiﬁcantly
above chance by the second session, N D 20, p D :04. Dinding’s performance was
signiﬁcantly above chance by the fourth session, N D 40, p D :02. Abby and Zuri were
performing signiﬁcantly above chance by the sixth session, N D 60, p D :007 and .05
respectively. For Dinar, performance did not exceed chance levels until the 18th session,
N D 180,p D :04.
The fact that four of the ﬁve subjects reached above chance levels within the ﬁrst six
sessionsoftestingisimpressive,particularlybecausethecorrectcategorydiVeredonevery
trial. In addition, no training on the DMTS procedure occurred prior to the ﬁrst session
oftesting.Bycontrast,subjectsinsimilarexperimentstypicallyundergoextensivetraining
withidentitymatchingbeforebeingtestedinconceptualmatchingprocedures.
Recallthatstimuliwererandomlypairedwithineachtrialsothatsometimesstimulithat
hadbeenpairedonprevioustrialsinpriorsessionswerere-pairedandsometimespairings
were novel. It is possible that the subjects did not map the photographs on to concepts for
each unique species but, rather, that they were rapidly able to learn associations between
Vonk (2013), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.158 10/25Table 1 Performance in Exp. 1. Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 1 on trials where exem-
plars comprised novel or prior pairings (Standard deviations in parentheses).
Subject Novelpairings Priorpairings
Abby 77.5 (17.9)
N D 26
61.7 (21.9)
N D 34
Dinar 58.2 (39.0)
N D 26
54.5 (13.8)
N D 34
Dinding 66.2 (20.6)
N D 28
65.2 (16.9)
N D 32
Molek 84.3 (15.0)
N D 23
78.3 (9.0)
N D 37
Zuri 69.4 (30.3)
N D 28
64.9 (17.6)
N D 32
particular exemplars based on reward contingencies. In order to argue against this latter
interpretation, paired t-tests were conducted to show that performance on novel stimulus
pairings did not diVer from performance on previous pairings, for the ﬁrst six sessions,
for any of the individual subjects, highest t2 D 1:67, p D :24. Only the ﬁrst six sessions
wereconsideredbecause,afterthat,thelikelihoodofnovelpairingsdecreasedsubstantially.
ThesedataappearinTable1.
Inaddition,onesamplet-testscomparedperformanceonbothnovelandpriorpairings
to chance (50%) for each subject for the ﬁrst six sessions. Only Molek was above chance
onbothnovel(M D 84%,SD D 15%,t4 D 5:09,p D :007),andpriorpairings(M D 78%,
SD D 9%,t4 D 6:78,p D :002).Abbywasabovechanceononlynovelpairings(M D 78%,
SD D 18%, t4 D 3:07, p D :05). The other three subjects were not above chance on either
novelorpriorpairingswithintheﬁrstsixsessions.Theseresultslendnosupporttotheidea
thatsubjectsrelieduponassociationsthattheyformedduringthecourseoftheexperiment
betweenparticularstimulipairingsandrewardinperformingthistask.
In order to determine if subjects were diVerentially accurate at matching photos
depending on the species or family of the animal depicted, separate univariate ANOVAs
of the subjects’ scores on each session, with sample species (species of the animal in
the sample stimulus) and incorrect species (species of the animal in the non-reinforced
comparison stimulus) as independent variables were conducted for each subject. ANOVA
assumes normality of data and homogeneity of variance–conditions that were satisﬁed
by the current data. Table 2 displays the average scores for each subject for each type
of discrimination, according to which specie was depicted in the sample. Dinding was
inﬂuenced by both the species of the sample stimulus, F4;25 D 5:66, p D :002, and of the
non-reinforced comparison, F4;25 D 4:23, p D :01. He scored above 66% for all species
except when the sample was a Japanese Macaque; on those trials he was below chance.
He also tended to score near chance levels when the non-reinforced comparison was a
proboscis monkey or a golden lion tamarin, indicating that he preferred to select those
images.
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crimination (according to the image depicted in the sample) for Experiment 1. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
Zuri Molek Dinar Dinding Abby
Tamarin 79 (03) 73 (13) 84 (10) 78 (12) 75 (13)
Gibbon 78 (10) 84 (09) 52 (12) 69 (15) 63 (10)
Jap. Mac. 81 (08) 76 (21) 58 (13) 42 (13) 75 (10)
Lemur 71 (14) 74 (09) 46 (10) 70 (13) 70 (20)
Proboscis 36 (13) 60 (07) 61 (14) 66 (18) 73 (13)
Dinar’s choices were inﬂuenced by the sample stimulus, F4;25 D 8:7, p D :001. He
matched accurately when the sample photo was of a golden lion tamarin but matched
inaccurately with every other type of sample. He was apparently distracted by the
non-reinforced comparisons, F4;25 D 8:78, p D :001. He made many errors when the lion
tamarinwastheincorrectchoice,indicatingapreferenceforphotosoftamarinsregardless
ofwhethertheywerethecorrectmatchesornot.Healsotendedtoselectphotosofgibbons
and lemurs when they were not correct choices. It is not unexpected that he might prefer
to choose gibbons over other primates because gibbons were visible from the orangutan
exhibitandweretheonlyotherprimatespecies,otherthanhumansororangutans,thatthe
orangutans were familiar with. Dinar’s results suggested that he did not use a generalized
concept to perform the task, but are not inconsistent with an ability to discriminate the
diVerentspeciesofprimates.
Molek’schoiceswereaVectedbythenon-reinforcedcomparison,F4;20 D 5:63,p D :003.
Heperformedaccuratelyonalltrialsexceptwhenthenon-reinforcedcomparisondepicted
a Japanese macaque, indicating that he selected the Japanese macaque photos often when
theywerenotcorrect.
Abby’s choices were not signiﬁcantly aVected by the sample species or by the non-
reinforced species, although the eVect of non-reinforced species approached signiﬁcance,
F4;20 D 2:64,p D :08.
Zuri’schoiceswereinﬂuencedbythesamplespecies,F4;15 D 13:06,p D :001.Shescored
above 70% on all trials except for when the sample photos were of proboscis monkeys.
She was also aVected by the species depicted by the non-reinforced comparison photos,
F4;15 D 3:83,p D :02.Shechoseaccuratelyontrialswhenproboscismonkeysweredepicted
in the incorrect comparisons, consistent with the idea that she simply avoided photos of
proboscis monkeys regardless of whether they were correct matches or not. She also did
well when tamarins were the non-reinforced comparisons but not as well when gibbons,
Japanesemacaquesorlemurswerethenon-reinforcedcomparisons.
Noneofthesubjects,withtheexceptionofDinar,appearedtohavesigniﬁcantlygreater
diYculty with the gibbon or lemur species, despite the fact that these photo sets included
diVerent species within the same family. This ﬁnding implies that the greater perceptual
diVerence between the sample stimulus and the comparison stimulus did not inﬂuence
respondingformostofthesubjects.
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this concrete level. They sometimes displayed idiosyncratic preferences for photos of
particular species but, overall, they discriminated between members of various primate
species, consistent with earlier research in which they selected photos of orangutans or
gorillas and avoided selecting photos of other primates (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk
& MacDonald, 2004). The present experiment extends this ﬁnding to photographs of
unfamiliar species, andto a new procedure. Useof a DMTS task hasan advantage over the
two-choice procedure in that no single exemplar is associated with reward or non-reward.
Instead it is the relationship between, or the pairing of, stimuli that determines the reward
contingency.Thefactthatthesubjectswerenolessaccuratewithnovelthanpriorpairings
isthusanimportantﬁndingandarguesagainstsimplestimulusrewardassociations.Other
experiments with the samesubjects revealedthat theydo not learn all DMTStasks equally
rapidly(Vonk,2002;Vonk,2003),implyingthatthereissomethingspecialaboutthenature
ofthesediscriminationsmakingthecategoriesreadilyperceivablebythesespecies.
The subjects diVered from each other in terms of which species they preferred to select
andwhichspeciestheyhadthemostdiYcultymatching.Ingeneral,however,theyseemed
to have diYculty with theproboscis monkey photos, which was unexpectedbecause those
photos were mostly, although not exclusively, of the same animal from various positions
but with the identical background, whereas photos of the other species varied along more
dimensions and sometimes even depicted diVerent species. This result therefore argues
against a reliance on perceptual similarities to make the discriminations or attention to
irrelevant background details. The diYculty may have stemmed from the fact that the
proboscismonkeysubjectstendedtoﬁllasmallerpercentageoftheentirephoto.
Above chance levels of performance were obtained within the ﬁrst six sessions by all
but one of the subjects, indicating that accurate responding did not require extended
training or learning of associations between the exemplars. Performance was no more
accurate on trials where speciﬁc exemplars had been paired before than on those trials on
whichstimuluspairingswerenovel.However,Dinar’spatternofrespondingsuggestedthat
he often simply selected photos that he preferred. Concrete level discriminations can be
made on a perceptual basis and are not necessarily demonstrative of abstract concepts
representing the species depicted. Thus performance may be expected to decline in
Experiment 2 where photos had to be matched according to intermediate level categories.
Exemplarswithinthesecategoriessharedfewerphysicalfeatures.
EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment was of critical interest. Few researchers have examined whether
non-human primates spontaneously classify other species according to biological or
taxonomic categories (see Brown & Boysen (2000) for one example). Could these subjects
match photos of members of various taxonomic classes (such as birds, reptiles, insects,
mammals, and ﬁsh) despite the fact that exemplars within a category would share only
some features, and may also share features with exemplars from another category? This
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and might corroborate previous ﬁndings (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk & MacDonald,
2004).
Method
Subjects
ThesubjectswerethesameﬁveanimalsthatparticipatedinExperiment1.
Materials
Thephotosetincludedthirtynovelcolorphotos,sixfromeachofthefollowingtaxonomic
classcategories:birds,insects,mammals,ﬁshandreptiles.Photosincludedsingleorseveral
individuals, pictured close-up or at a distance, faces or entire bodies. The subjects in the
photoswerealsopicturedinavarietyoforientationsandpostures.Figure3depictssample
images from the categories of birds and reptiles. Each photo appeared once during each
session. Whether or not the photo appeared as a sample, correct, or incorrect choice was
randomly determined on each session. Photos were also randomly paired. Within each
session one diVerent exemplar from each taxonomic group appeared as a sample twice
and as an incorrect choice twice as well. Thus, out of ten trials within a session, two of the
sample photos were ﬁsh; two were birds, insects, mammals and reptiles. The same thirty
photos were used in each session. A list and description of the photographs appears in
AppendixS2.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the diVerent materials noted
above.Inaddition,thesubjectsdidnothavetoberewardedfortouchingthesamplephoto
on the ﬁrst two sessions, because they had already mastered the DMTS procedure. Each
subject received four or ﬁve blocks of ﬁve sessions depending on the number of sessions
requiredtoreachastablelevelofresponding.
Results and discussion
AsshowninFig.4,andconﬁrmedwithbinomialtests,eachsubjectperformedsigniﬁcantly
abovechance(50%)overall,N D 200or250,allp’s D :001.Individualbinomialtestswere
conductedtodeterminehowmanysessionswererequiredforeachsubjecttoachieveabove
chance levels of performance. Molek and Dinar required only two sessions to perform
above chance, N D 20, both p’s D :04. Abby performed above chance after only four
sessions, N D 40, p D :04, and Dinding performed above chance after only six sessions,
N D 60,p D :05.Zuri,ontheotherhand,required14sessionstoreachabovechancelevels
ofperformance,N D 140,p D :04.
In order to argue against an interpretation favoring rapid learning of associations
between particular stimuli, paired t-tests were conducted to show that performance on
novel stimulus pairings did not diVer from that on previous pairings, for the ﬁrst six
sessions, for any of the subjects. These data appear in Table 3. Performance did diVer
between novel and prior pairings but only the diVerence for Dinar reached signiﬁcance,
and his performance was actually better for novel (M D 74%, SD D 5%) than for prior
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(A–F) and Birds (G–L).
pairings (M D 52%, SD D 11%), t4 D 3:31, p D :05). Again, there was no evidence that
subjectswerelearningtochoosecorrectlybasedonrememberingassociationsbetweenthe
stimuliandpatternsofreward.
Vonk (2013), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.158 15/25Figure 4 Results from Exp. 2. Average percent correct across blocks of 5 sessions (50 trials) for each
subject in Experiment 2.
Table 3 Performance in Exp. 2. Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 2 on trials where exem-
plars comprised novel or prior pairings (Standard deviations in parentheses).
Subject Novelpairings Priorpairings
Abby 49.2 (20.9)
N D 39
81.9 (26.1)
N D 21
Dinar 74.5 (5.2)
N D 43
51.8 (11.2)
N D 17
Dinding 58.8 (16.3)
N D 41
78.4 (21.7)
N D 19
Molek 77.9 (7.4)
N D 41
71.6 (29.9)
N D 19
Zuri 51.3 (7.4)
N D 44
51.0 (47.5)
N D 16
Inaddition,onesamplet-testscomparedperformanceonbothnovelandpriorpairings
to chance (50%) for each subject for the ﬁrst six sessions. Performance was above chance
on only novel pairings for Molek, (t5 D 9:62, p < :001) and Dinar, (t5 D 11:44, p < :001).
Performance on prior pairings alone was signiﬁcantly above chance for Abby (t4 D 2:73,
p D :05) and Dinding (t4 D 2:92, p D :04). Zuri’s performance was not above chance for
eithernovelorpriorpairingswithintheﬁrstsixsessions,highestt5 D 0:44,p D :68.
IndividualunivariateANOVAsofthesubjects’scoreswithclass(ofthesamplephoto)as
theindependentvariable,foreachsubject,revealedaneVectofclassthatwassigniﬁcantfor
Dinaralone,F4;20 D 6:82,p < :001.Dinarscoredabove69%correctonalldiscriminations
except for birds, on which he performed close to chance. Dinding also had diYculty with
birdtrialsaswellaswithmammals,F4;20 D 2:40,p D :08.Theclassoftheanimalsdepicted
in the sample did not signiﬁcantly aVect the performance of Molek, (F4;14 D 1:54), Abby,
(F4;14 D 2:06), or Zuri, (F4;14 D 1:01) all p’s > :05. Average percent correct on trials with
eachtypeofdiscriminationaredisplayedinTable4.
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crimination (according to the image depicted in the sample) for Experiment 2. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
Zuri Molek Dinar Dinding Abby
Bird 65 (13) 75 (17) 53 (06) 57 (06) 80 (08)
Fish 63 (05) 85 (06) 73 (08) 69 (16) 68 (10)
Insect 60 (14) 65 (06) 71 (05) 68 (04) 70 (14)
Mammal 80 (27) 85 (10) 72 (05) 58 (08) 73 (10)
Reptile 60 (16) 73 (22) 70 (11) 72 (11) 60 (08)
Only one of the subjects, Dinar, showed signiﬁcant diVerences in accuracy based on
which class the sample photo belonged to. Dinar may have been distracted by preferences
for particular photos in both experiments. However his accuracy in this experiment was
higherandhisperformancewasmoreconsistent.Theothersubjectswerenotsigniﬁcantly
distracted by preferences for photos of animals belonging to particular taxonomic
categories.
The orangutans were able to rapidly discriminate amongst species from diVerent
taxonomic classes and did not have to learn to make associations between the exemplars.
However, the gorilla did not reach signiﬁcant levels of performance until the third block
of sessions suggesting that she was not as predisposed to making these discriminations
initially.Inaddition,heraccuracytendedtobebetteronExperiment1,whereasthereverse
was true for at least two of the orangutan subjects, Molek and Dinar, (although these
tendencies were statistically signiﬁcant only for Dinar when performance was compared
across experiments, (repeated measures ANOVA, F1;24 D 8:18, p < :009). The increase in
performance for these two orangutans might be attributed to prior experience with the
DMTS procedure in Experiment 1. However the same increase was not found for other
similarlytrainedsubjects(ZuriandDinding).Inaddition,Abby,whohadbeenpreviously
trained on DMTS tasks in a diVerent study (Vonk, 2003), and who was tested on both
experiments simultaneously, performed equally well across experiments. This ﬁnding is
not consistent with the claim that performance on the more concrete level task might be
superioriftaskorderingwasnotafactor.
CONCLUSIONS
It appears that orangutans learn intermediate level discriminations at least as readily
as they learn concrete level discriminations (see also Vonk & MacDonald, 2004). This
is consistent with the prediction made for humans (Keil, 1988; Rosch et al., 1976), and
possibly with ﬁndings from chimpanzees (Tanaka, 2001, although see Vonk et al., 2013),
but not from squirrel monkeys, pigeons (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988) or gorillas (Vonk
& MacDonald, 2002). The gorilla subject in the present experiments seemed to learn the
concrete level discrimination more rapidly despite the fact that she was simultaneously
learning the DMTS task for the ﬁrst time. However, it is diYcult to make cross-species
comparisons when fewer than ﬁve subjects of each species is tested, particularly given
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with young humans suggests that the intermediate or basic level concepts are learned
before subordinate or concrete level discriminations (Rosch et al., 1976). A general
assumption is that categories acquired earlier in ontogeny are also more accessible to
more phylogenetically removed species. Although the current study was not designed to
address developmental changes in concept acquisition, the fact that at least one gorilla
showedgreaterfacilitywithconcretelevelcategoriesisinterestingandisworthyoffurther
exploration.
Intermediate level categories are those that maximize within-category similarity and
distinctiveness relative to between-category similarity (Medin & Smith, 1984; Mervis &
Rosch, 1981). It is unclear whether these categorizations are readily made because of
an inherent tendency to detect perceptual similarities within classes and dissimilarities
between classes, or whether such categorizations must be learned through experience
with the exemplars or natural instances (Medin & Smith, 1984). It is also unclear whether
experiments such as these direct the creation of a concept, or merely provide evidence
for pre-existing concepts in the subjects (Huber, 1999; Roitblat & Von Fersen, 1992).
However, the fact that subjects achieved above chance levels of responding with both
of these discriminations more rapidly than they did with diVerent kinds of MTS tasks
(Vonk, 2002; Vonk, 2003), despite learning the DMTS procedure for the ﬁrst time here,
indicates that the categories may have been spontaneously perceived, or at the very least,
relatively easy for these subjects to acquire. The current experiments provide the most
directcomparisonbetweenacquisitionofvariousconcreteandintermediatelevelcategory
discriminations made at a perceptual level in the absence of additional information, such
aslabelsorbiologicalfacts.Theythereforeprovideevidencethatcategoriesatvariouslevels
ofabstractioncanbeacquiredintheabsenceoflinguisticlabelsorbiologicalknowledge,in
atleasttwoofourclosestprimaterelatives.
Previous studies have shown that items may be correctly classiﬁed spontaneously and
without regard to experimental training but have not directly contrasted classiﬁcation
at various levels of abstraction (Murai et al., 2004; Murai et al., 2005). Cerella (1979)
investigated the ability of pigeons to discriminate oak leaves from leaves of other species.
Results from his series of experiments lent support to the idea that these taxonomic
classiﬁcationsweremadespontaneouslyanddidnotinvolveinduction.Signiﬁcanttransfer
was made to multiple unique positive exemplars after training with a single exemplar,
and transfer did not depend upon contrasting the original instance to negative instances.
Typically, learning of experimentally deﬁned categories requires presentation of both
positiveandnegativestimuli(Sutton&Roberts,2002)andisimprovedbythepresentation
of multiple exemplars (Katz, Wright & Bachevalier, 2002; Sutton & Roberts, 2002; Wright
& Katz, 2007). That Cerella’s pigeons did not require this experience might suggest a
pre-existingconceptforoakleaves.Thenumberofexemplarspresentedwasalsolimitedin
thecurrentexperiments.
Furthermore, Cerella’s pigeons had diYculty discriminating between instances of oak
leaves that varied on speciﬁc dimensions, despite the fact that they could discriminate
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suggest that pigeons may be hardwired to perceive oak leaves as belonging to the same
species, unique from other species of leaves, as opposed to learning the discriminations
by attending to distinct physical features in the stimuli. In the current study, at least three
orangutans learned rapidly to judge animal members of diVerent taxonomic classes as
belonging to the same category, despite lacking experience with many of the species
depicted in the test stimuli. The rapid learning could not be attributed to learning
associations between speciﬁc exemplars because both the orangutans and the gorilla
were at least as accurate with newly paired as with previously paired exemplars. Thus
it is possible that concepts for intermediate level categories are readily extracted from
shared perceptual information between the stimuli. The gorilla subject appeared to learn
to classify the stimuli similarly after several sessions, suggesting that she was capable of
perceivingdistinctionsbetweenthecategoriestestedbutdidnotdosoimmediately.
In an interesting test of spontaneous classiﬁcation, Brown & Boysen (2000) presented
chimpanzees with pairs of photos depicting diVerent species of animals and required
them to identify the pairs as being either the same or diVerent. The chimpanzees showed
above chancecategorization despite notbeing diVerentially reinforcedfor their responses.
Interestingly, whereas they were slightly more likely to classify tigers and housecats as the
“same”,theywerenotmorelikelytoclassifygorillasandchimpanzeesasthe“same”,relative
to the other comparisons tested. Therefore, whereas there was some evidence for more
intermediate level discriminations, in general, the spontaneous discriminations made by
the chimpanzees were more analogous to concrete level discriminations. Findings from
thisstudyarelimitedbasedonthefactthatchimpanzeeswerepresentedwithspeciﬁcpairs
and might indicate them to be diVerent but could not also indicate that they were more
similartoeachotherthantootherpotentialpictures.Forexample,theymayhaveindicated
that chimpanzees were diVerent from gorillas but still might have had the capacity to
categorize chimpanzees and gorillas as more alike than chimpanzees and lions. This
capacity was not tested, however. In one of only two other studies to investigate various
levels of abstraction in chimpanzee concept formation (Tanaka, 2001) the procedure
does not allow comparison of the relative ease with which the two levels of concept
discrimination were achieved. In Vonk et al. (2013), only two chimpanzees were tested
indiVerentordersasanattempttocontrolforordereVectsinlearningthediscriminations
at various levels. One chimpanzee did not show evidence of concept acquisition at any
level, and the other found discriminations more diYcult as they became more abstract.
The current study was able to test for multiple possible category matches in the same
session without setting one category as correct or incorrect as in Vonk et al. (2013). In
the current study, we were also able to assess whether matches were more diYcult for
particular species or class comparisons and whether errors revealed associative learning,
perceptualconfusionsoruntrainedpreferences.
InBrownandBoysen’sstudy(2000),chimpanzeeswerelesslikelytojudgetwodiVerent
chimpanzees as being the same, relative to their judgments for cats, tigers, ﬁsh and
gorillas. This result is not surprising, given that animals may be more inclined to detect
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2007). Face processing in particular may be speciﬁc to one’s own species in other primates
(Dufour, Pascalis & Petit, 2006). In the current experiments, orangutans were slightly
less likely to correctly match members of the same primate species, as compared to their
performance for members of broader taxonomic groups. Perhaps this ﬁnding is due to a
greater tendency to perceive individual diVerences amongst other primate members. It is
possible that basic or intermediate level discriminations are most critical to an animal’s
survival and that, at the more concrete level, even ﬁner perceptual discriminations are
made.
The results of the current experiments cannot rule out a perceptual basis for making
taxonomic classiﬁcations, because a certain degree of perceptual overlap is necessarily
evident among members of a class. However suYciently diverse stimuli were used here, to
rule out the use of single or few features. The subjects were required to make judgments
basedonrelativelyfewexemplarsandreachedhighlevelsofperformanceafterfewsessions.
This result may be considered more consistent with the idea of an innate mechanism
for distinguishing among members of a class on a perceptual basis (Cerella, 1979), as
opposedtoinducingrulesabouttheassociationsbetweenstimuli(Gelman,1989;Mandler,
2000). However, subjects who did not initially perform at high levels did learn to match
at very high levels. This ﬁnding suggests that even when categorizations are not made
spontaneously, other non-human Great Ape species do possess the capability for applying
rulesbasedonthepresenceorabsenceofmultiplerelevantfeatures.
Hampton (1998) demonstrated the inﬂuence of biological knowledge on humans’
classiﬁcations of similar natural stimuli; birds, ﬁsh, insects and animals. This knowledge
inﬂuencedclassiﬁcationmorethanitinﬂuencedtypicalityjudgements.Thepresentresults
are not consistent with the idea that language (Benelli, 1988; Nelson, 1988) or scientiﬁc
knowledge (Inagaki, 1989) is necessary for making natural taxonomic classiﬁcations–at
leastnotattheperceptuallevelofcategorization.Insteaditwouldappearthatourabilityto
categorize organisms based on biological similarities is shared with other members of the
animalkingdom,atleastwithothernon-humanprimates.Thesedistinctionscanclearlybe
madeonthebasisofpresentationoftwo-dimensionalstimulidepictingspecieswithwhich
thesubjectshavehadnoexperience.
In accord with the hypothesis that language is not needed to support the categorization
of natural stimuli, human infants have been shown to categorize in a manner that
corresponds to those categorizations made by adults on the basis of biological knowledge
(Eimas & Quinn, 1994). Clearly infants do not yet hold conceptual representations of
biological categories and yet, the fact that these perceptually based discriminations
correspond to mature adult conceptual discriminations is important. As concepts are
learned they may be inﬂuenced by cultural contexts, particularly the labels provided by
natural languages (DavidoV, 2001; Whorf, 1956); However, Rhodes & Gelman (2009) have
shown that cultural context is important for the categorization of artifacts, but less so for
natural objects. Following a meta-analysis of concept studies across cultures, Malt (1995)
concludesthatthereissigniﬁcantstructureprovidedbynaturalcategoriestoevokesimilar
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(e.g., bird species). Across cultures, there was great convergence between folk concepts
and scientiﬁc concepts. However, she concludes that the issue is more complex in that
culturally speciﬁc beliefs may inﬂuence categorization at more abstract levels. Data from
such cross cultural studies and comparative studies (such as this one) converge to suggest
that the ability to designate linguistic labels for categories is not necessary for creating at
least perceptual representations of biological categories (see also Wasserman & Devolder,
1993). Perhaps both infants and non-human primates have acquired the ability toperceive
categories,anabilitythatmayunderliethecapacityto developabstract conceptswhosefull
emergence may yet depend upon the development of language. This latter conjecture has
yettobeproven.Thecurrentexperimentsareastartinthatdirection.
In deﬁning “concepts” it is important to distinguish between perceptual versus
conceptual processes (Eimas & Quinn, 1994; Huber, 1999; Mandler, 2000; Premack, 1983).
Because the subjects in the current study were able to correctly match members of various
taxonomicgroupsafterabriefdelaybetweensampleandteststimuli,itispossiblethatthey
maintained a representation of the category itself and not only of the particular sample
exemplar. This possibility is made more likely by the important ﬁnding that the subjects
did not rely upon remembering previous pairings of stimuli. In addition the subjects
here were required to make an instrumental response to the stimuli. These results might
thus constitute evidence for a conceptual versus a purely perceptual representation. Use
of a concept is implicated when an individual is able to form a coherent category from
exemplars displaying some shared and yet many distinctive features (Spalding & Ross,
2000). Analysis of single features in isolation is not suYcient for the formation of abstract
concepts. Instead, the individual must combine and compare various features and make
some determination as to which features are deemed critical for category membership. In
thecurrentexperiment,orangutansandonegorillawereabletoanalyzevariousperceptual
aspects of two-dimensional photographs and to use this information to represent distinct
categories.Furtherworkisneededtoclearlydiscerntheextenttowhichsuchcategoriesare
perceptualversusconceptualinnature.
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